Translocation of species, populations, or genotypes beyond their historic ranges (i.e., assisted migration [AM]) is an oft-debated climate adaptation strategy. Well-
T A B L E 1 Examples of emergent disease resulting from human activities that alter pathogen composition, host composition, or environmental the diverse pathways that cause disease emergence. Moreover, they rarely make concrete, comprehensive recommendations that would be effective in addressing these concerns (Table  2 ). In the United States, federal agencies, state agencies, and conservation groups lack policies governing AM, making it difficult to systematically address disease risks. We describe pathways through which AM may result in unanticipated emergent disease, using the "Disease Triangle" a conceptual framework in plant pathology. We make specific recommendations for reducing disease risks in AM activities and highlight where knowledge gaps should prompt caution. We then consider current regulations in the U.S. governing aspects of conservation, species movement, and disease as starting points for AM disease policy. Our objectives are to provide land managers and policymakers with an understanding of disease risks associated with AM and to propose best practices and possible regulations that integrate realistic risk assessment with conservation objectives.
Disease is just one example of a species interaction possibly impacted by translocation, an oft-cited concern in the AM debate. Here, we focus solely on disease dynamics to make our recommendations for policy and best practices as clear, concise, and directly applicable as possible. Our discussion of disease risk assessment, however, is applicable to other unpredicted, undesirable changes in species interactions possibly resulting from AM management actions. As such, we suggest that assessing disease risks provides an example of the sort of whole system assessment that would be required to fully address potential adverse consequences of proposed AM actions.
We refer to AM as any translocation of species, populations, or genotypes to reduce climate impacts, but we highlight the ways in which AM acting on these varying ecological scales may influence disease differently. For example, the movement of climatically tolerant genotypes into a region to improve stand productivity (as is increasingly common in Canadian forestry) may have different implications for disease dynamics than the introduction of an entirely new species. We briefly discuss potential implications of these differences below.
THE DISEASE TRIANGLE
Diseases, biotic interactions that result in an organism's physiological impairment or mortality, emerge from the cooccurrence of three necessary factors: a susceptible host, an infectious agent, and an environment that fosters pathogenesis, as described by the Disease Triangle (McNew, 1960; Figure 1) . AM alters all three axes of the Disease Triangle simultaneously by moving hosts, possibly introducing hitchhiking pathogens, and changing the environmental conditions they experience. Here, we assess the contribution of each axis to T A B L E 2 Examples of AM management plans or assessments and the extent to which these documents recognize the possible disease risks (via pathogen introduction, host introduction, and changes in environmental conditions) and make concrete recommendations to address these risks 
Changing the pathogen axis: risks of hitchhikers
The AM debate has focused on the invasion potential of translocated species (Ricciardi & Simberloff, 2009) , while the risks associated with hitchhikers on target species are often briefly mentioned, with few specific recommendations given ( Table 2) . Translocation of seeds, live plant material, or associated soil may also translocate that organism's microbiome (Anderson et al., 2004) . Some hitchhiking species, such as mycorrhizal fungi, may play positive roles in achieving AM goals, and microorganisms dependent on their hosts could also potentially be conservation targets (Moir et al., 2012) . However, human movement of plant material has caused numerous accidental pathogen invasions, leading to significant financial impacts and ecologically devastating declines in plant and wildlife populations (Table  1) . Although many diseases have been introduced through horticultural and agricultural activities (Anagnostakis, 1987; Brasier, 2008) , accidental introductions of pathogens have also occurred through well-intentioned ecological restoration efforts (Rooney-Latham, Blomquist, Swiecki, & Bernhardt, 2015) . These latter cases bear clear similarities to AM. Sources for hitchhikers are ubiquitous. Large-scale greenhouses used to propagate species for AM can create hospitable conditions for growth and spread of many non-native F I G U R E 1 AM may alter each of the three factors necessary for disease emergence, as defined by the classic disease triangle: pathogen virulence or inoculum potential, host composition and relative susceptibility, and the impact of the environment on each of these processes (McNew, 1960) pathogens (Brasier, 2008; Parke & Grünwald, 2012) . Furthermore, due to past introductions caused by other human activities, plants harvested in situ for translocation may carry non-native microorganisms, in addition to their "native" microbiome (Rooney-Latham et al., 2015) . Microorganisms' short generation times, cryptic natures, and capacities for asexual reproduction, dormancy, hybridization, and rapid evolution make these hitchhikers significant invasion threats (Anderson et al., 2004; Stukenbrock, 2016) .
For plants harvested from native systems, pathogencarrying individuals often appear asymptomatic, making visual assessment insufficient to eliminate hitchhikers. Sanitation measures, including sterilization of planting materials and regulation of water sources within greenhouses, can reduce risks associated with nursery-grown plants (Parke & Grünwald, 2012) . However, sanitation practices are typically costly, labor-intensive, and inconsistently implemented in greenhouses. Sanitation practices also typically focus on known pathogens or close relatives of common pests, rather than species that may become problematic at destination sites (Parke & Grünwald, 2012) . Direct seeding can reduce the risk of introducing non-native pathogens, compared to planting seedlings, though seeds may also carry some pathogens (Anderson et al., 2004) .
Threats associated with hitchhikers require different practical recommendations, compared to translocated target species. For example, risks for invasion by AM targets are thought to be lowest if they are moved across short distances (Schwartz et al., 2012) . However, target species' current environments may contain non-native microorganisms; therefore, hitchhiking microorganisms may be moved to destination environments that are more geographically and ecologically distant from their origins, in contrast to target organisms (Rooney-Latham et al., 2015) . Sanitation provides a means of reducing those risks, yet it is important for managers wishing to proceed with AM to understand the limitations of current practices. Given the imperfect baseline knowledge of microbial communities, the prevalence of non-native pathogens in greenhouse and native environments, and limited adoption of sterilization practices, risk management should include actions to reduce hitchhiker-related risks, acknowledge incorporating important unknowns, and develop explicit contigency plans into AM decision-making tools (Schwartz & Martin, 2013) .
Changing the host axis: risks of "spillback"
Diseases have emerged from agricultural and silvicultural activities that introduce new plants (i.e., hosts) to non-native environments or manipulate their densities (Table 1 ; Burgess & Wingfield, 2017; Shaw, Fillip, Kanaski, Maguire, & Littke, 2011) . AM activities similarly alter the "host" axis of the Disease Triangle by introducing new species or changing host density at recipient sites. For many threatened species, this may help achieve a desired outcome, allowing target organisms to "escape" human-altered diseases in their current environments. However, introduced AM species or genotypes can be more effective hosts for native pathogens at recipient sites. This phenomenon, referred to as "spillback," subsequently alters disease risks and physiological impacts on native plant neighbors at the recipient site (Burgess & Wingfield, 2017; Kelly, Paterson, Townsend, Poulin, & Tompkins, 2009) .
AM targets are typically translocated over shorter distances, and to sites more like their origin communities, than the agricultural or silvicultural translocations that have contributed to emerging diseases via changes in host composition (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2008) . The movement of plant genotypes, alteration of host density, or introduction of new host species, especially close relatives of species in the destination community, however, may still generate risks for disease emergence (Burgess & Wingfield, 2017; Shaw et al., 2011) . Many plant-microbe interactions in natural systems are unspecified (Ricciardi et al., 2017) . Trials determining target species' or genotypes' susceptibility to pathogens native to the proposed destination community may be challenging, but could improve our understanding of spillback risks associated with AM. Improved understanding of plant-microbe interactions will be most important for AM activities proposed in communities containing hosts that are closely related to the target species or where generalist pathogens play important ecological roles. "Host-switching" may be most likely under these conditions (Burgess & Wingfield, 2017 ).
Changing the environment axis: risks of climate-driven disease emergence
Many documented emerging infectious diseases are thought to be driven by climatic shifts altering host-pathogen relationships in their existing habitats (Figure 1, Table 1 ). AM, by definition, introduces species or genotypes to novel environmental conditions. Novel conditions can alter existing host-pathogen relationships, shifting interactions from neutral to negative, or vice versa (McNew, 1960) . Altered climatic conditions impact host susceptibility and pathogen virulence through changes in host physiology and effects on rates of pathogen reproduction and survival (Sturrock et al., 2011) . Vital rates that determine host susceptibility and pathogen virulence do not solely depend on mean values of future temperature or precipitation, making translocation risks difficult to predict (Jung, 2009; Sturrock et al., 2011) . Disease dynamics are influenced by climatic variability including exposure time to specific temperatures, precipitation levels, climatic optima, or thresholds (Sturrock et al., 2011) . AM translocation plans often ignore shorter-term climatic fluctuations that can generate surprising disease dynamics or facilitate host-switching in the intervening period (Early and Sax 2011, Stukenbrock, 2016) . The distinct impacts of climatic variability, rather than averages, on host-pathogen dynamics should be explicitly considered in a thorough risk assessment.
THE AM POLICY VACUUM
We have highlighted the ability of AM to affect disease dynamics in the recipient system. Although there is potential for AM to generate positive impacts, a formal risk assessment weighs these benefits against the potential to do unintended harm. Evaluating AM through the Disease Triangle suggests substantial risks of adverse impacts based on ecologically damaging or economically costly disease emergence associated with previous translocations (Table 1 ). There are currently no policies in the United States requiring evaluation of risks, arbitrating among competing risks (i.e., extinction vs. invasion vs. disease release), characterizing the conditions under which AM should proceed, or clarifying responsibilities in the event of unintended disease emergence. Here, using the United States as an example, we draw on existing regulations for managing threatened species, invasive species, and disease as examples for developing better regulation of the disease risks associated with AM (Table 3) .
Conservation law and policy
Proponents of AM for threatened or endangered species in the United States often point to Section 10(j) of the U.S. Endangered Species Act (ESA) for legal authority and decision framework for AM of rare species (Shirey & Lamberti, 2010) . Indeed, the nonessential, experimental population designation, meaning that an experimentally created population is deemed not essential to species persistence, may provide a clear process for introduction and monitoring of a translocated species (Camacho, 2010; Shirey & Lamberti, 2010) . The ESA also provides a formal framework for consultation with multiple state and local entities while ensuring that final authority rests with U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), potentially streamlining coordination across jurisdictions. Finally, the USFWS has developed partnership programs (e.g., Comprehensive Conservation Agreements, Conservation Agreements with Assurances, etc.) to facilitate cooperation and resource sharing (Table 3) .
Current USFWS policy restricts 10(j) introductions to within species' historical ranges. A shift in USFWS policy to allow species introductions outside of historic ranges would still legally require analysis of environmental impacts under the National Environmental Policy Act (Shirey & Lamberti, 2010) , which offers an opportunity for formal assessment that identifies risks and uncertainty. Endangered species laws and policies, however, do not provide guidance on how to weigh species extinction risks against the potential adverse implications to recipient ecosystems through translocation. These laws also do not apply to private individuals moving plant species obtained through legal means (Shirey & Lamberti, 2010) , further complicating AM management and making culpability difficult to assess. As such, it does not appear that existing implementation of conservation laws or policies adequately addresses the trade-offs in using AM, especially considering disease risks.
Invasive species law and policy
Accidental pathogen introductions represent an important component of the disease risks associated with AM, suggesting a strengthening of invasive species laws or policy could play a role in reducing hazards. Despite some federal policy, states are responsible for the bulk of invasive species management (The Environmental Law Institute [ELI], 2002) . The passage of Executive Order 13,112 in 1999 created the National Invasive Species Council to foster coordination among federal and state efforts and ensure that federal activities do not exacerbate invasive species challenges (Table 3 ). Amendments to the Plant Protection Act (7 U.S.C § 7782 (2006)) make it possible for the federal government to grant resources to other entities managing noxious weeds potentially reducing financial burdens. Finally, many invasive species policies establish culpability and penalties for violations, though enforcement is rare and often difficult (ELI, 2002;  McCubbins, Endres, Quinn, & Barney, 2013).
T A B L E 3 Examples of existing U.S. policies addressing risk assessment, coordination, incentives, and accountability in endangered species, invasive species, and disease management highlighting potential strengths and weaknesses for consideration when developing comprehensive AM policy Despite extensive policies directed at managing invasive species, it is argued that most states tend to over-regulate potential agricultural pest species while neglecting species that do not directly impact crop species (McCubbins et al., 2013) . Regulatory variation among states makes the system only as strong as the weakest state (Brasier, 2008) . The federal government maintains its own list of invasive species to govern interstate movement of species; however, regulation at the federal level has been incremental and piecemeal with multiple federal entities responsible for invasive species management (ELI, 2002; McCubbins et al., 2013) . State and federal approaches to invasive species management rely on lists whose composition is often determined as much by economic, political, and administrative considerations as actual invasion risk (McCubbins et al., 2013) . This process is often reactive, with species being listed after already causing widespread damage. Given these criticisms, it is likely that existing invasive species policy is insufficient for governing disease risks in AM.
Disease management policy and best practices
The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) devotes substantial resources to preventing outbreaks of disease. APHIS' focus is often on known threats to agricultural systems, but this agency does have regulatory authority over plant materials that carry known ecologically damaging pests and pathogens. Its capabilities include quarantine authority over disease threats within their purview, emergency response, and mechanisms for providing resources for disease prevention. Quarantine authority is important; however, it requires that the pathogen has a known past impact, appropriate source locations have been identified, and that disease is detectible.
Following recent introductions of ecologically damaging invasive plant pathogens in the United States, voluntary nursery certification programs and sanitation best practices have been developed to help growers reduce the occurrence of potentially harmful plant pathogens in the materials they produce (Parke & Grünwald, 2012) . Though these programs are voluntary, these guidelines can provide a helpful starting place for mandatory regulations on plant materials used AM-focused plantings, to reduce introductions of non-native pathogens.
TOWARD AN AM POLICY
Existing environmental regulations and policies in the United States only partially address disease risks in AM (Table 3) . We propose that a more complete policy provides for enhanced risk assessment, accountability, and coordination in managing these risks inherent in AM activities.
Enhanced risk assessment
Contemporary AM risk assessments focus almost solely on the target species and are evaluated by comparing extinction and invasion risks. In contrast, disease risks are often treated as minimal or uncertain (Table 2) . Viewing AM through the lens of the Disease Triangle highlights the need to develop risk assessments that address other impacts to the whole system, rather than simply evaluating whether moving a plant is likely to create an undue disease introduction risk. Existing sanitary approaches may reduce risks of hitchhikers (Parke & Grünwald, 2012) , but do little to alleviate nontarget species risks posed by AM. Failure of reactive approaches to invasive species management makes it clear that risk assessment is key to managing disease emergence. Thus, we recommend AM policy move beyond single-objective assessments (i.e., assessment of target species benefit) toward integrated system-wide risk assessment.
Coordination
Risks of spillback and pathogen introductions across natural and agricultural systems arising from AM demand better coordination between state and federal policy makers and conservation, horticultural and agricultural managers. The National Invasive Species Council provides one model for approaching this challenge, creating a central venue for voicing concerns and intentions to engage in AM across jurisdictions. The relationship between the council and agencies with authority to approve or reject AM proposals must be made clear to ensure proper oversight. This could follow the consultation model prescribed by the ESA combined with APHIS risk management strategies.
Incentives and liability
Diseases have caused significant economic losses (Anderson et al., 2004 ) that may portend AM-induced disease impacts. In developing policy to reduce AM risks, we think that incentivized or mandatory nursery sanitation approaches, creating early detection protocols, and designing emergency response plans should rise to the top as priorities that currently do not uniformly guide other translocations (e.g., restoration). Policy should also clarify the authority for AM decisions and specify how culpability is determined and damages are assessed. State-level invasive species policies provide a starting point; however, enforcement will be key to deterring unauthorized translocations.
We recognize that AM and the abandonment of historical baselines as conservation objectives creates unsettled ethical, legal, and practical concerns for managers and conservation practitioners (Camacho, 2010) . These should motivate, not deter, development of proactive comprehensive policy, given disease risks outlined here. We suggest that current fragmentation (and occasional competition) in policies governing AM should make federal agencies reticent to participate until such comprehensive policy exists. Without a cohesive policy that spans jurisdicions and agencies, the default "policy" may simply include programs that discourage private industry from engaging in unregulated AM. The costs of inaction, resulting in some level of species extinction, may ultimately outweigh disease risks associated with AM. This will be a social choice, informed by scientific knowledge. Making that choice responsibly requires evaluation of important tradeoffs via risk assessment procedures that incorporate the multiple mechansims contributing to disease and a coordinated set of best practices. Without these, AM remains a conservation strategy driven by best intentions but with potentially detrimental outcomes.
